On top of renewed pressure from Belarus, the Hungarian “factor” has once again added to Ukraine’s concerns
Kyiv Post
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Over the past two weeks, the war has been actively transitioning into the summer season. The winter’s lack of foliage and the cold made attacks and counterattacks unproductive and excessively dangerous. The summer promises to be dynamic and vicious.
Russia has already begun active military operations near the cities of Sumy and Chernihiv in northeastern Ukraine. Not only has shelling intensified there, but we have seen attacks by armored groups and the seizure of villages nearer to the Russian border.
At the same time, in Belarus, on the orders of its president Alexander Lukashenko, roads are being hastily constructed towards the Ukrainian border. Belarus is also moving air defense systems closer to Ukraine.
Recently, not for the first time, Lukashenko himself began regaling his European neighbors with threats of Russian nuclear weapons.
Are these “preparations” another bluff to force Ukraine to transfer more personnel and equipment to the northeast, thereby weakening defenses in the south and the Donbas? Or has Russian President Vladimir Putin finally managed to convince Lukashenko to actively join the war against Ukraine?
We will find out the answer to this question in June or July, when the scale of Russia’s “summer” offensive becomes clear. According to Ukrainian military sources, Putin has set a new deadline for his troops to seize all of the Donbas – September 2026.
Ukraine is rapidly building a defensive line from the Kyiv Reservoir to Sumy to block a potential Russian “buffer zone” as Moscow regroups for possible new offensives.
Inside Russia, increasing expressions of discontent over the protracted war are pushing the Kremlin to seek new military solutions. Russians are not protesting against the aggression, but against the internet and mobile phone shutdowns, which everyone understands are connected with the war.
Restricting internet access will help Russia avoid organized protests if the authorities resort to forced mass mobilization, which now seems more likely than before.
Fewer people are willing to fight for money, and a major offensive will require an increase in troop numbers of at least 300,000 to 400,000. The mobilization and training process could take two to three months. This means that if Russia begins mobilization in May, the front will receive reinforcements in July, at the height of the “summer” military season.
The Hungarian factor
Meanwhile, we had only just finished celebrating the defeat of Viktor Orbán’s party in the Hungarian parliamentary elections, when a new blow was struck – a blow that anyone watching carefully could see coming, but which had not been much mentioned in the Ukrainian press. Hungary’s incoming Prime Minister, Péter Magyar, demanded that Ukraine immediately resume Russian oil supplies through Ukrainian territory via the Druzhba pipeline.
In March, Orbán tried to force Kyiv to resume oil supply by blocking an EU loan for Ukraine, but President Volodymyr Zelensky stated his personal position on the matter, saying “I would not re-open the pipeline.”
Recently, however, in a conversation with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Zelensky said that the pipeline would partially resume operations by the end of April. Magyar expected Russian oil to start flowing into Hungary immediately after his election, but this did not happen. Now that the transit of Russian oil via Ukraine has recommenced, there is a sense of bitterness among many Ukrainians.
On seeing the back of Orbán, Ukraine may wish to make a step towards supporting Hungarian interests. However, the transit of Russian oil to Hungary through Ukraine, in the fifth year of an unjust and cruel war and during an escalation of attacks from the aggressor, flies in the face of reason. Russia will earn money by selling oil to Hungary, and this money will undoubtedly go towards paying for further atrocities against the Ukrainian people.
Another issue, which no one has yet raised, is the question of Russia’s payment for transit. Now that the pipeline has resumed operations, Russia, as before, must pay Ukraine for using it.
The money earned by Ukraine in this way will be used for the Ukraine’s war effort. In other words, oil deliveries to Hungary will contribute to an escalation of hostilities on both sides. The key issue, however, is that Russia will be earning money in the EU, and the EU will find itself partially financing the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
The dispute over the seizure of Ukrainian bank vehicles by Hungarian prosecutors remains unresolved. The dollars, euros, and gold that were on their way from Austria to Ukrainian banks are still in Hungary and, until they are released, they serve as yet another tool with which to pressurize the Ukrainian leadership.
Although Magyar has stated that he doesn’t see Ukraine joining the EU in the next 10 years, and despite Hungary’s apparent determination to avoid supporting Ukraine in its defensive war against Russia, Kyiv has not given up hope of normalizing relations with Budapest. A Hungary that is “neutral” toward Ukraine would be preferable to a hostile one.
It will be necessary to seek some kind of mutual understanding and a special common language to support relations between our two countries. This is particularly important now that pro-Russian forces have come to power in Bulgaria, indicating that the pro-Russian coalition in the European Union is by no means on the wane.
The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily of Kyiv Post.
