Steve Ross: Thanks everyone for joining. Looking forward to this joining. Looking forward to this.
Farooq Sobhan: Yeah, we’re all set.
Steve Ross: Great. We’ll just wait for a minute for folks to log in and then we’ll get started.
Farooq Sobhan: Can I ask whether there’s going to be a Q and A, or is this just the panelists?
Steve Ross: Yeah, so we will incorporate Q and A and a and then with time left over, we’ll do a specific Q and A, but I think we’ll get started. First of all, welcome to everyone and thank you for joining us. We are gathering at a truly pivotal moment in Bangladesh’s trajectory. Just two weeks after elections swept the Bangladesh Nationalist party to power, and a week after a new prime minister cabinet and parliament were sworn in. How did Bangladesh arrive at this point and what lies ahead? We are joined by a truly excellent panel to help us unpack Bangladesh’s domestic policy and its foreign relations.
First, we have Muhib Rahman, Perry World House Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania. Razia Sultana is a senior research fellow at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies. Avinash Paliwal is a reader in international relations at the School of Oriental and African Studies. Farooq Sobhan is a former foreign secretary in Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and joining me as a co-moderator of the discussion, Elizabeth Threlkeld, senior fellow and director of the South Asia program here at Stimson. As we get underway, please drop your questions into the Q and A function.
We will try to incorporate as many of those in the discussion as possible and if there’s time left over at the end of the discussion to have a dedicated Q and A session. I’m going to start with some questions about the lead up to the elections in Bangladesh. Muhib, I’d like to start with you and let’s go back to July of 2024. Can you take us back to that moment and help set the context for our discussion? How did the student protests emerge and evolve and in the early days after Sheikh Hasina’s fall, what were the priorities set by the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus?
Farooq Sobhan: You’re mute.
Muhib Rahman: Sorry about that. Thank you Steve for having me. It’s great to be here in the panel. In the summer of 2024, what students and Gen Z activists achieved was remarkable. I don’t mean that just as a compliment, but in a precise analytical sense. Let’s try to understand what was there. There was not an ordinary democratic backsliding. It was fully consolidated regime, the hardest, we know the hardest one to dislodge. There was a complete media control. Civil administration and police was not just compliant but institutionally integrated into regime survival. The opposition was manufactured, designed to give a fake legitimacy with zero real threat.
The real opposition like the BNP and Jamaat was fully paralyzed with five million politically motivated legal cases and thousands got killed. They were subject to enforced disappearances and the Digital Security Act created an atmosphere of fear silencing everyone. Military was also fully satisfied through parks and promotions tied to party loyalty and India was providing backdrop international backing. So, the honest analytical question was how on earth did this regime fall? I think the answer starts with the students themselves. What was distinctive about this movement, I think, which genuinely surprised people was the breadth of the movement and the bravery.
Not just public university students who are traditional source of protest movements in Bangladesh, but private university, English medium schools and students with backgrounds that had historically stayed out. They stood their ground in the face of cold-blooded shootings. The language gravity slogans all were very culturally rich and politically sophisticated. Capturing the public imagination. Another less appreciated dimension is their remarkable maturity when the regime fell. They didn’t just celebrate and go home. They had already thought through what reforms were needed and how to build public confidence.
I think choosing Professor Yunus was probably the single most consequential decision of the transition. His credibility a single-handedly diffused the highly orchestrated disinformation campaign framing the uprising as chaos or extremism. But let’s be honest about it, the students did not do it alone. BNP and Jamaat were heavily involved. Their members and supporters populated their protest movements providing financing and coordination through party structures. The Awami League itself was this decisive actor. The crackdown 4,000 killed 20,000 injured, didn’t suppress the movement, it exploded it.
The decision to shoot the students was I think Hasina’s greatest political miscalculation. The military’s choice not to seize power as historically unusual for Bangladesh. They did not agree to suppress the protest. I think just to summarize the interim governments that followed the protest movement, it rests on two dual legitimacy. One was in UNICEF’s international credibility. On the other hand, students treat legitimacy and these dual legitimacy provided the transition and unusual stability and created the political space for credible election within 18 months.
Steve Ross: Thank you. Muhib. Razia, turning over to you, you wrote an excellent piece for South Asian voices, a sister website of the Stimson Center, about the structural fragilities in the lead up to the elections. Can you describe some of the challenges facing the interim government and how would you assess their performance in addressing some of the challenges you highlighted, including stabilizing the economy, restoring the rule of law, and advancing domestic reform?
Razia Sultana: Thank you, Steve for your questions. It’s really nice to see all in the panel discussion. Thank you so much for having me and giving me the opportunity to discuss a few words about the current situation that has been going on in Bangladesh. Probably if I I mean echo with Muhib that the interim government has taken a lot of hurdles to around the country because of crackdown of the Awami League suddenly and after the July revolution. Probably if I compartmentalize all the challenges during the interim government, I mean both internal and external, I found there are a lot of social economic political challenges. Are there.
For instance, if I talk about the political challenge, the first one I must say that I mean maintaining law and order situation in our country is one of the core areas that the interim government has to address. Probably I saw in a deliberation that Dr. Yunus mentioned that one of the core issues for him is to all the demonstration that had been going on in different ministries. He mentioned that in 18 months of his tenure, almost like more than 50 chaotic events that he had to address.
So, I think that was one of the biggest challenge for Dr. Yunus to address. The second point that I would highlight that in this election, I mean 13th parliamentary election, more than 50 political parties joined. So, bringing all the political parties, I mean for discussion under the same roof probably was one of the biggest challenge for interim government as well. Because each political parties, they are scattered, especially during the Awami League government and sometimes even they were disorganized. So, probably in that case, I mean despite everyone has their political agenda and ideological difference. I mean Dr. Yunus especially, I mean have wonderfully made it.
And the third point that I would like to highlight is to organize a free, fair election on the time, probably one of the biggest challenge. In the one hand on the other, I would say that Dr. Yunus made it very wonderfully that we have witnessed and now probably we are enjoying the fruit of that kind of initiative. From the economic point of view, we know that immediately after the July uprising, one of the biggest challenges for retaining the economic growth, especially when our banking system was completely cracked down, especially some of the private sectors there, I mean their situation was very fragile, but I mean the central bank had to struggle a lot to being all kind of… I mean to make some kind of balance.
But despite that, from economic point of view, they had to take a lot of initiatives. Now even I want to add the social aspects. For instance, it has been said that probably during the Awami League government, I mean the minority group was safe and sound. And during the interim government period, it was one of the probably biggest concern for the interim government to ensure the safety and security of the minority group. And if I put aside all kinds of social, political and economic use, probably I must mention the external factor as well. You know that during the current previous interim government, the bilateral relationship between Bangladesh in India was some kind of frozen, I must say.
But since Bangladesh, I mean it was heavily dependent with India mean during the previous time. I mean during the interim period, Dr. Yunus had to look for other destination to maintain the economic stability in the country. Besides that, I found that one of the key issues that I wanted to add here that the social media narratives between Bangladesh and India, because it is very hard. I mean after the long-term lacking of the freedom of speech, suddenly the people, it seems to me that has found the opportunity to speak freely.
So, I mean from that point of view, it seems to me that the general people, those who cannot talk, I mean via other sources of electronic media, social media, probably one of the easiest to express their views and to change their political situation in our country. So, I mean to one on all kinds of negativity and negative narratives especially and portray the image of our country is another one of the biggest challenge for the interim government to address. So, I mean in brief, both internal, external factors work a lot and probably these are the major challenges that I wanted to highlight you, I mean to you.
Elizabeth Threlkeld: Thanks Razia, and you’ve given me a great opening to jump in with a couple of questions more focused on foreign policy during the interim government period. And Farooq, I want to bring you in here. You are exceptionally well positioned given your background to give us an overview really of how the interim government approached foreign policy during its tenure. I know it’s a big question, but particularly curious how the interim government’s approach differed from that of Sheikh Hasina overall and whether there were any continuities there.
Farooq Sobhan: Well, I suppose the first and most important priority of the interim government was as far as fund policy was concerned to get the international community to endorse and recognize the Yunus government. To engage with it. We were fortunate in that by and large, I would say with perhaps the sole exception of India, the interim government did receive the recognition and the acceptance of the international community as a whole.
I think this was very important in terms of both trade and the fact, as was just mentioned earlier, the enormous economic challenges that were faced by the interim government and the need to get the support of our friends and partners abroad in particular, I would say the US, the European Union and our neighbors in the ASEAN region, Japan, Korea, they all stepped forward. We also received recognition and support from the members of the OIC. That’s the Islamic states. For us, as you know, something that’s very important has been remittances. And so, maintaining contact and good relations with the Gulf states in particular, Saudi Arabia is our largest market, but also with countries like Malaysia.
So, this worked out quite well. Yunus is known and has throughout the international community, he has good personal relations with virtually every head of state or head of government. And this certainly proved to be a big help. We know that efforts were made in terms of trying to engage with India. Yunus did make a phone call to Mr. Modi. He was even willing to pay a visit to India. So, there were efforts, but it’ll be recalled that India took the view that this was in some ways not a legitimate government. They very early on made the point that they would only engage with an elected government.
So, one of the issues which then became very important was given the fact that India looms very large in terms of the neighborhood, and we had very substantial relations with India, which in some ways progressively got worse. Certainly during the first 12 months of the interim government, we saw apart from stopping of visas as the transit arrangements, which were very important for Bangladesh, the air transit arrangements were stopped and various other measures were taken, which did prove to be create problems for Bangladesh. So, the ability to engage with the rest of the international community was very important and we did receive, I would say, very strong support on the whole from virtually all the other countries in the world.
Elizabeth Threlkeld: Thanks for that. And let me come to you now, Avinash and maybe to drill down a bit further, specifically on this question of shifts in relations with India and another state we haven’t heard too much about, but Pakistan under the interim government, you had done a really insightful interview for us with South Asian voices on the topic, and I would recommend it highly to our viewers today if you haven’t seen it yet. But Avinash, how do you see Dhaka’s ties to Islamabad and New Delhi under the interim government?
Avinash Paliwal: Thank you, Elizabeth. Let me start with saying that we need to acknowledge one thing, which is on 5th of August 2024 with the ouster of Sheikh Hasina, this event was a strategic shock as far as India’s regional policy is concerned, as far as India’s foreign policy in particular with relation to Bangladesh’s concerns. And I think that shock of that moment having invested so much capital and energy in Sheikh Hasina for the preceding 15 years, I think played a significant role in shaping both the policy track of New Delhi towards Dhaka as well as the political track.
And these are two tracks on which India’s conversations about Bangladeshi politics, about Bangladeshi economics, about who do you work with, how do you work with to what effect really played out. That conversation played out, and I think one of the many reasons that India felt both in political conversation and policy conversations about the interim government were antagonistic. They were both, of course India was engaging with the Yunus government, but it was an antagonistic approach. It was a strategy where coercion was being used, be it in terms of statements, be it in terms of messaging, in terms of not meeting the principles, political principles or meeting them in a fairly tepid manner.
You could see that the sense of shock of 2024 and the fact that Sheikh Hasina is in India and there are many former army leaders who are still kind of taking refuge in India, whether it’s in West Bengal or elsewhere. That played a huge role in shaping India’s approach towards it. I think what we have seen with the elections is a shift at least in one of the two tracks, which is in the policy track. I think right now there is an appreciation in New Delhi that the mandate with which the BNP has come to power allows India to engage with a bit more equanimity of bit more positive equity when it comes to diplomatic outreach to the elected government led by Tarique Rahman.
And I think that’s where all the conversations about a reset that have emerged, this whole vibe about Indian Bangladesh approaching a reset, that is where it comes from. I would still caution against that and simply that’s simply because the political track is yet to reconcile with the policy track, and there is one very clear timeline. There are elections coming in West Bengal, there are elections coming, state elections in Assam, and I think till the time those elections do not pass. And we have clarity about what state governments will form, and Assam is led by the Bharatiya Janata party, which is the Hindu Nationalist Party in India in West Bengal.
The BJP is facing a challenger in the form of Trinamool Congress. These are really important elections as far as that particular geography and demography is concerned once these elections, we pass these elections and there is some degree of political clarity for these states and the BJP government in Delhi as to what the larger dynamics of your eastern flank would look like. Then I think there’s likely to be a case where both the policy and political tracks in India will start to come together in hoping for a much more mature, much more productive conversation with Dhaka. So, that’s one timeline that I would flag to all the listeners.
My last point on the India question of course is that having said that, we would’ve reached a stage where the two countries can have an honest conversation, can have a serious conversation. I think that is when also the difficult part begins. How do you deal with the fact that the Ganga Water Treaty is coming for a renewal? You have to renegotiate those terms. How do you renegotiate the fact that the Godda Power Plant was being the terms of trade were set, which many people in Bangladesh feel were much more friendly or favorable to a particular company based outside of India?
So, I think a lot of those actual conversations that renegotiation, I think we will see that play out over the entirety of the BNP government over the next three to five years. Hopefully not that long, but this reset will take a political cycle if at all, right? So, again, I’m optimistic that there’ll be conversations where that goes to be seen. And finally coming to your question, Elizabeth, on Pakistan, I think just as much as this was a shock for India, this was an opening for Pakistan. And I do believe that Pakistan tried to make most of this opening despite the fact that Pakistan is undergoing a lot of tumult in structural systemic fashion, whether it’s economics, politics within Pakistan itself, you could see a lot more military to military engagement.
You could see a lot more diplomatic engagement. You could see that the Pakistani high commission in Dhaka was getting quite active both in social media and in gathering the kind of outreach which we have not really seen by Pakistan in Bangladesh during the Sheikh Hasina period. So, they were really coming out of the shell. But again, I would caution, I do not foresee a strategic reset of the software. Bangladesh will suddenly decide to put its eggs, its diplomatic eggs in the Pakistani basket, and that’s the simple reason if you keep the India angle out of it as well, is the fact that Bangladesh’s economic equities are much stronger.
The fundamentals of that economy is much stronger than that of Pakistan. Despite its troubles with India, it’s geographically not positioned in a sensitive place located between Central Asia and South Asia and then China in the north. The pressures that Pakistan is facing thanks to its geography are not the kind of pressures that Bangladesh faces. And I do believe that there’ll be a lot more room for negotiation from Dhaka to have that relationship and rewire that relationship in its own benefit if the BNP government plays its God’s rights and to make sure that Pakistan does not ultimately become a thorn in what is a very badly needed reset between Bangladesh and India itself.
And those are the kind of conversations I can foresee happening most likely in private, but definitely happening in the next coming three to six months and probably longer.
Steve Ross: Thank you. Thank you Avinash, and thank you to all for unpacking what things look like ahead of the elections on the foreign policy front, largely a good news story for Bangladesh with the large caveat of relations with India and then on the domestic front, a series of challenges that I think the panelists assessed as being managed fairly well by the interim government. Let’s turn to the elections themselves and Razia, I’d like to start with you on that and to ask if you can describe a bit the process in the run-up to the polls themselves.
It was a tense period of time in the lead up with just in December, the killing of a prominent student leader, Osman Hadi, Tarique Rahman’s return from 17 years in exile, the death of his mother, former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. What stood out to you about that period during the campaign and what were some of the key messages that you think that BNP and Jamaat in particular were trying to get across to the electorate?
Razia Sultana: Thanks Steve for getting me again. Actually, during the period when Hadi was assassinated, during that, the political situation of the country was completely devastated and even the general people didn’t expect that the, I mean the election would be held because the, I mean situation was so unstable, it was quite difficult to predict that I mean within a few months, the interim government will be able to organize a free and fair election.
I mean the general people was very much in an uncertain situation, but whenever the Tarique Zia came back in Bangladesh, I think the situation was completely different because whenever Tarique Zia came after exiling almost 17 years later, people, I mean received him with pomp and grandeur, probably you have seen. I mean a lot of expectation then grew up from the general people, especially to BNP, but I mean the path was not that much easy. Plus quite bumpy I would say, because the interim government had to create a conducive environment for organizing the election.
I must say that even I wanted to mention I mean demise of Begum Khaleda Zia because it created, I think, I don’t know, probably create a positive environment, especially from BNP side because the… I mean Khaleda Zia who had been in power for quite a long time before and then she was prisoned. And she had to sacrifice a lot for her party and when Tarique Zia came probably had demise create a positive note for, I mean Tarique Zia. But immediately after coming into power, the BNP especially… I mean when Tarique Zia came back, during that time, the BNP was disorganized, but probably it has taken time for BNP to come back again.
On the other side, I found that the Jamaat-e-Islam also an important factor in political culture of Bangladesh. Especially if, I mean talk about the election process, I found that for the BNP side, they have taken the later on organized the candidates from both the combination of the old and the young people especially. I found that I mean current Prime Minister Tarique Zia has relied on the experienced candidates. If you see the total candidature, probably you might have seen that I mean he relied on some of the previous ministers during the Khaleda Zia tenure. And on the other side, he tried to bring in some of the young fresh-minded candidates.
I mean to bring all the new ideologies and the ideas and one of the key, I must say that the motives of Tarique Zia is I mean to make a new Bangladesh. I mean probably this is the motto that, I mean the general people digest a lot and create a conducive environment in Bangladesh. On the other side, if we, I mean see the formation of the candidature of Jamaat-e-Islam, perhaps we can see that the candidates, especially they are quite young, especially probably 80%, more than 80% of them are young and energetic and probably, I mean the coalition of with the NCP has given a new dimension in Jamaat-e-Islam.
Now, when I talk about the BNP’s agenda, I must say that they came with some kind of manifesto before election that, I mean attracts the general people, especially I wanted to highlight some of the key mottos that they try to campaign especially to maintain the law and order situation. Then the second one is reduce the price of the commodity. As you know that Ramadan is going on and before that, they declared the 180 days of agenda that they are going to reduce the price of the general commodities. So, it creates positive environment for the general people. The third one is to reduce the traffic jam in the country and improve the railway system side by side, so to make the navigation easier for the general people.
And the final one is to improve the health sector. I wanted to mention the family card which attracts the general people. Family card, I found in the newspaper that already in 14 countries that they already have introduced family card and especially it has already been popular in the northern part of our country because the northern part is very much relied on the agricultural products, those who are struggling for their daily livelihoods. So, such kind of family card, I mean creates a positive boost for on behalf of BNP.
On the other side, if I talked about Jamaat Islam and along with the NCP, they came with different agenda, especially because of the sensitivity of the history and other things you know very well. So, they try to portray and focus on the July revolution agenda. Basically I mean, the spritz of the departed soul, I mean those who have been lost the lives during the July uprising. So, apart from that, they tried to highlight the unemployment issues, the social justice, reduction of the corruption, which is one of the key blames that has been given to the shoulder of the Awami League government.
Probably these three, four agendas for the core issues for Jamaat Islam that during the election, during the campaign period, they try to spread among the general people. If I mean talk about these three major political parties, especially BNP, then Jamaat along with NCP and you see that Awami League was not in a scene and they have been banned and although it was been speculated that probably it, I mean chaotic situation. But after that, since the general people no longer accept the Awami League’s agenda and everything that they tried to slap during their tenure, probably that’s why BNP and Jamaat were the major political parties.
Being the independent political party, I must say that probably that those things, which I mean who is very popular among the female candidates and her campaign was quite unique. I found that it was very fascinating because I mean she tried to campaign, which is very much noiseless and she was very much focused on the general people’s comfort.
And she tried to establish a different political culture that is, although she lost and she got only 44,000 of votes, but despite that, I found that her election campaign, along with her intellectual ability to go door to door and give her message to the general people that okay, fine, the biggest political parties, those who have done for long, probably they are the new generation newcomers who are trying to give some kind of comfort to the general people, so that the upcoming days are very much conducive for the general people. Yeah.
Steve Ross: Thank you Razia. Just in the interest of time, I want to jump to Muhib. Think Razia, you gave us a picture of some of the rationale for why BNP was able to win so big in the elections, particularly in an environment that seemed to be quite competitive between BNP and Jamaat Muhib. I’d be interested in your insights into why you think BNP was able to be so successful and what accounted for such a wide margin of victory.
Muhib Rahman: Thank you, Steve. I think Dr. Sultana touched upon some of the issues related to campaign, where BNP had the upper hand. I’ll not touch upon those, I’ll just try to be brief in the interest of time. To my understanding, I think the victory for BNP was highly expected. I think if you look past the social media, BNP had this wide largest popular base all around the country. It’s one of the two foundational parties with deep roots established by General Zia Rahman, and it tried to act as a de facto opposition during the 15 years of repression and it survived, I think, and it had the organizational structure wide distributed all around the country.
The simple fact that Awami League did not participate, I think also helped BNP in a sense, in a way that BNP was able to attract a large share of Awami League voters, especially from the ethnic minorities. Also people on the political left, the idea that the poll was supposed to be a close contest I think was more of a social media artifact because there was a genuine hype run after the election that Jamaat and the NCP might do really well, at least give a very strong contest with BNP, but it was mostly among a particular segment of society that is urban-educated youth and middle class. So, Jamaat and NCP did really well in attracting major share of voters from that segment of society.
But in general, overall, I think BNP fared much better, especially its campaign was something that widely resonated. Dr. Sultana already mentioned the idea of family card and also the fact that Tarique Rahman was back from exile after 17 years that created, that homecoming created sort of a goodwill for BNP and also the depth of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia was also I think created a lot of sympathy for BNP. She’s a leader who commands respect across the political and social spectrum in Bangladesh. The thing that I want to emphasize is that the challenge with this paradox of two-thirds majority, initially the expectation was that BNP might not be able to have the two-thirds majority.
We just needed to change the constitutions, but it eventually got, and now the challenge is basically because that creates that sort of temptation of gradually creating conditions for autocratic consolidation or democratic erosion, and we need to see how that pans out over time.
Elizabeth Threlkeld: Thanks, Muhib. I’ll jump in now and we’ll zoom ahead to consider some of the implications, which I think we’ve already been doing throughout, but Farooq, I’m going to come to you with a foreign policy focus question now that we know what the setup is going to be in Dhaka. So, for the 15 years of Sheikh Hasina’s rule, Bangladesh’s foreign policy has been governed by the principle of friend to all and malice to none. The new foreign minister Tarique Rahman recently declared that the BNP-led government’s diplomatic doctrine would be guided by the principle of Bangladesh first and a bold and responsible foreign policy. Break that down for us. What do you expect that to mean in practice?
And I’d ask you sir, to focus in particular on Bangladesh’s approach to relations with China and the US at perhaps a difficult geopolitical moment.
Farooq Sobhan: Well, certainly Bangladesh first, I think he’s stressed two points in particular. The first was when he emphasized Bangladesh first and the second was that there would be, as it were, a continuity of the foreign policy of General Zia and when he was president and some of the initiatives which he took. Well, we certainly need to remember that one of the major initiatives taken by President Zia was the opening to China and the establishment of closer defense cooperation with China. I think he spoke to the media today about the spate of meetings which he had including with both the US ambassador as well as the Chinese ambassador.
And I think he also met all the EU ambassadors and the Indian and Pakistan high Commissioners as well as the Saudi ambassador. So, he did stress certain basic principles, mutual respect, mutual benefit and so forth. My sense is that one of the key features of the foreign policy of the BNP government is going to be economic diplomacy in particular trying to position Bangladesh as an investment hub in the region. I think this has been articulated in different ways by the finance minister, and this certainly means that we will try and engage with all the countries across the globe.
So, yes, we will, as mentioned by the foreign minister, Bangladesh’s interest will be the forefront in terms of our engagement with our partners across the globe. I think it was very important the meeting today with the EU ambassador and the EU and the member states of the member states, he stressed the desire of the EU to maintain and further strengthen relations as indeed did both the ambassadors of China and the United States. Yes, I think one of the key challenges for this government is going to be balancing relations on the one hand between the US and China on the other within the region.
We certainly, and he has stressed this more than once, Dr. Khalil, that we would like to see a normalization in our relations with India and there are certainly some challenges there and I suspect Avinash is going to focus on that. I think it’s going to be very important for us also to strengthen our ties with the ASEAN countries on the one hand and the Gulf cooperation and the Gulf States on the other, the Gulf states are, as I mentioned earlier, a major market for employment for Bangladesh workers, and one of the very significant features of the last 18 months has been the record remittances that have flown into Bangladesh from our workers and that really provided an enormous boost to the economy, to our balance of payments.
And obviously, it’ll be the effort of this government to continue this. Saudi Arabia has already indicated that they will continue to take workers from Bangladesh, but then it also becomes incumbent on the part of the government to address the issue of skill developments and language skills and trying to really develop a much more sophisticated Labour force in terms of employment abroad and certainly at home. The other point, which of course one of the issues for us has been the issue of LDC graduation.
And we have mentioned that we are going to seek a further deferment of this perhaps by three years because the truth is that there’s been very little preparation taken to prepare for LDC graduation where we will stand to lose some of the tariff benefits which we currently enjoy, particularly to the EU market as well as several other countries. I’ll round off by saying that we will, as the foreign minister has said, follow a more proactive foreign policy. Bangladesh has always been a very strong believer and supporter of the multilateral process as well as the regional process.
So, one of the things which Dr. Khalil has mentioned, and so has the state Minister Foreign Affairs, Ms. Shama Obaid, that we are going to try and revive SARC and that’s going to be something of a challenge given India’s current reservations about SARC. But we have also been great believers in the un, and as you know, we’ve been major contributors towards peacekeeping and the multilateral process in general is facing challenges. So, what does this mean for Bangladesh’s foreign policy?
Going ahead, we will have to see, but I want to conclude by saying that the focus and here we are going to certainly see a team effort with the finance minister and the foreign minister playing a lead role with the captain of the team, obviously being the prime minister in this effort to position Bangladesh as an investment hub in the region, which means improving the investment climate, a whole host of regulatory reforms and really trying to put both the foreign office missions abroad, as well as the bureaucracy as a whole energizing it and imparting it with the necessary expertise and skills.
Elizabeth Threlkeld: Great, thank you so much sir. And just for our viewers, the LDC graduation issue is the UN’s list of least developed countries for those who aren’t following that closely. So, Avinash, I want to come to you and do a couple things here. So, I’m actually curious to pick up on what Farooq had mentioned in terms of certainly what this means for Bangladesh-India relations. We’ve seen the invitation by President Modi for Prime Minister Tariq Rahman and his family to visit. So, curious for your thoughts on the scope question, where can they repair and where the pitfalls. But then very briefly, if I can also ask for your perspective on this question of broader regional connectivity.
SAARC has been mentioned, is this a moment that could open up new windows for building on that connectivity in a region that is unfortunately well known to be the world’s least connected?
Avinash Paliwal: Thank you. Thank you, Elizabeth. Look, before I respond to question of scope between India and Bangladesh and where this is headed or likely to head in or the question of connectivity, I think what we are seeing right now is a very basic fundamental conversation between the family and India. And that question is simply can we trust? And the question in New Delhi right now is having put your eggs in the basket of the Awami League for 15 years and having the interim government for 18 months, can you trust the Rahman family? That’s a bottom line question that New Delhi is asking.
And I think a lot of conversations have been going on behind closed doors for a long time. I mean definitely after 5th of August 2024, but even before to a certain extent. And I think a lot of the parley that we are seeing between the BNP and the BJP or the government, the party to party channels, there are party to government channels, government to government channels is to basically establish whether we can have an understanding to work on. And there’s a good reason for that. I mean if you would have asked anyone before perhaps the fall of a Hasina regime, what do you think about especially personalities, whether it’s Tarique Rahman or the BNP generally?
I think there would’ve been a whole dollop of skepticism, especially among the Indian community. And that skepticism stemmed from the fact that during 2001 and 2006, the BNP Jamaat Coalition did not all go well for India’s security interest and strategic interest. And even before in the 1990s when the BNP was in power, that was a particularly sensitive moment for India, whether it was inter-communal disharmony that existed in India after Babri Masjid demolition, and the BNP’s response there too, and various issues around connectivity more broadly. So, I think what we are seeing right now is whether Delhi believes it can work with Tariq Rahman in the next five years and right now the signs are promising and let’s hope that remains to be the case moving forward.
Now coming to the question of scope, I think the first two things are fairly straightforward. The most important thing in they ever ask when they ask this question of trust is can the BNP protect Bangladeshi Hindus one and two, can you make sure that Bangladeshi soil is not being used by militants who will be targeting Indian interest in the Northeast? Right? We saw what happened in Manipur after 2023. That situation is still far from stable. The Naga Accord has just been struck at a draft stage, has not been signed. So, there are all sorts of anxieties. And of course, I mean the larger kind of political landscape in West Bengal and Assam that I referred to earlier.
So, can you deliver these two things where broadly the Bangladeshi Hindu community from an Indian standpoint is secure? Is part of the contract? And the answer to that at the moment is very clear, yes, especially as far as BNP’s both word and deed is concerned. Can you make sure that Bangladeshi soil is not being used by militants? But now the answer to that also is yes. So, I think these are really positive signs. This brings us to the third issue that India has always valued to varying extent when it comes to Bangladesh is the question of connectivity, right?
I mean look, this will be the most challenging thing in a counter-intuitive sense because the relationship between India and Bangladesh under the Hasina government on the question of connectivity from one vantage was brilliant, right? The bilateral trade went up to $16 billion, which is a huge figure. But the issue is it was all going against the Bangladeshi economy. Bangladesh was having a huge trade deficit and given India’s own sensitivities about trade deficit, it enjoys or abhors with China. It was only fair that Dhaka would say that this is a huge trade deficit. So, connectivity is helping India, not really Bangladesh.
And for a country where the two big sources of revenue is RMG exports and remittances from abroad, the export question becomes a very big question. I think that is where I feel the economic conversation might actually spring surprises because that will be a tougher conversation to have to rebalance the term of period. It seems to be the easier conversation to have, but might turn out to be the most difficult one to have. And I think that’s something we should be very aware of. Economics is very political today and this is where it ties us back to the question of Bangladesh first, this is a global moment. Everyone is going first, America is going first, China is going first, India is going first.
So, in some senses the BNP is echoing the global mood on nationalism and protectionism, but the actual political economy is militating against that. So, this is a contradiction which I would keep my eyes open to moving forward.
Steve Ross: Thank you, Avinash. And as we come to the top of the hour, I’d like to turn it back to domestic politics and perhaps close with a couple of questions that are focused on that. One is oriented around the BNP supermajority in Parliament and what that means for the prospects of the implementation of the July Charter and constitutional reform and the constitutional referendum that was adopted simultaneous to the election. And the second question is around the politics of retribution. Tariq Rahman, even during the campaign period and since he was sworn as Prime Minister has expressed a desire to move beyond the politics of retribution.
And I’m curious if you can shed some light on what that looks like in practice and perhaps in particular what it means for the future of the Awami League’s role in politics in Bangladesh. Razia, maybe I’ll start with you and then over to you Muhib after with the same questions.
Razia Sultana: Thank you Steve. Again, after coming to power, we have seen that there is a clear division, especially between the BNP and Jamaat about the referendum issue. It’s not like that only the voting system or the election took place. But on the other side, the issue of referendum has gained a lot of discussions among the general people that whether the BNP is going to accept this. The July Charter, we have seen that the BNP general secretary has mentioned that probably they have taken the first vote, the second what they’re not going to do now during a few days back.
I mean their point was they didn’t come here with the July Charter issues and their point is the July Charter and everything, the referendum has not yet been ratified in the Parliament. So, they are not bound to, except at the moment, although they have said that they are going to take next 180 days. And I mean since they came with the general people’s mandate, probably over time one by one, they’re going to accept this. But one point I would like to highlight here that I mean during the election campaign, they have mentioned that for a smooth transitioning of the power, probably the presence of the caretaker government in the referendum is very important.
Not only for BNP but also for other bigger political parties. Because whenever any political party tries to retain their power for a long-term, it’s not good for the other political party. And the current Prime Minister Mr. Tarique Zia mentioned that they are going to agree with that one, but over time I think we have to oversee that how BNP is going to take this decision in course of time. The second point, BNP also accepted the issue of the Prime Minister tenure. In the current chart, it’s been mentioned that, I mean after two years round probably, I mean any candidate cannot be the prime minister and the BNP being a larger political party also accept this issue.
So, although in the July Charter, there are a lot of issues that there and some of the issues that jumbled up at the moment, but some of the core issues that is the increase the power of the judiciary system, carving the corruption from the society, Some of the issues BNP also agrees. I mean it’s early to say that how BNP will go in course of time. Probably we have to wait and see that whether they’re going to accept the July Charter or not.
But from my point of view that since the general people give their support probably being one of the biggest popular political party at the moment, BNP has to rethink that if in case they are, I mean making delay with that, it is the general people probably who can come up. Also, that has been already mentioned by the opposition party that if the NCP and the Jamaat-e-Islam as well. But at the moment, they’re told that Jamaat-e-Islam will not do anything because they also want to maintain a secure, I mean the conducive environment after the election.
But one thing is very clear that probably both the countries, both the political parties now have the responsibility, I mean to retain the peace and tranquility in the country. In that case, probably July Charter, I mean whether the winner or the loser, they have to consider these issues, the Charter. Apart from this, I think the Jamaat-e-Islam, those who basically focus on the July Charter, they said that especially the NCP candidates, they already mentioned that they will strictly try to establish the, I mean the agendas that has been mentioned in the July Charter. So, let’s see how both the parties can, I mean, raise these issues and especially the BNP, how they can accept or ratify this through the Parliament.
Steve Ross: Thank you Muhib over to you on the question of the politics of retribution and what that might look like, overcoming that in practice.
Muhib Rahman: Thank you, Steve. Before going to that, I just want to briefly touch on the question of July Charter. I think this is a little bit complicated than a general understanding of how we are seeing BNP’s reaction to July Charter from the very beginning, BNP did not want to accept some of the, had a note of dissent to some of the very key propositions in the Charter and there was a clear expectation among the people that BNP might not honor the July Charter entirely. I think that’s this kind of playing out after they have two thirds majority.
And it is not about, I think whether BNP agrees to implement the Charter or how, I think it’s more about how much the opposition, the BNP, sorry, the Jamaat and NCP can push the government towards that direction. On the question of public retribution, I think my assessment is that it’s going pretty well. We haven’t seen a very large scale violence after the election. BNP seems quite accomodative towards the Awami league. And I think the question would be more about in-fighting within the BNP groups over like patronage networks and the sources of RAN in the local level.
The violence is also going to be more related to the question of who controls the issues, like sources of corruption and everything. So, on the retribution part, I think the recent context is doing quite well and I don’t expect this to be really going really bad over the next five years.
Steve Ross: Great. And thank you very much for that. And thank you to everyone who has stuck with us a few minutes beyond the hour, both on Zoom and on YouTube, and very grateful to Farooq, to Muhib, to Avinash, to Razia for really giving us an excellent overview of the last one and a half years in Bangladesh, domestic politics and foreign relations. And I think some key guideposts of things to look out for in the coming months as BNP establishes itself in power. So, great. Thank you to all and we look forward to continuing to watch this space and thank you again.
