Trump's negotiation strategy of talks, strikes may lead to unfavorable deal for Israel - analysis

The US’s retaliation to the downing of the helicopter over the Strait of Hormuz both exposed US President Donald Trump’s strategy towards Iran and displayed why the goals of the US may be at odds with those of Israel. 

Trump still believes in negotiations, for a variety of reasons and considerations that have been discussed extensively. Trump wants a deal, still prefers the diplomatic path, and is looking for the moment when he can stand before the cameras and announce that he has restored order to the region and the world.

But in the Middle East, as usual, the road to an agreement first passes through smoke, fire, statements, denials, leaks, and phone calls that none of the participants will be eager to describe in full. 

The incident over the Strait gave Trump a clear justification for a strike that was easy to explain to the public.

A US Apache helicopter crashed near one of the world’s most sensitive shipping routes. Two crew members were rescued. Trump blamed Iran. US strikes on Iran followed.

The White House had little difficulty explaining the strike. A US president, even one who prefers peace to war, cannot spend weeks issuing threats, watch one of his helicopters go down near Hormuz, and respond only with expressions of concern. Trump said that Iran had “taken too much time” in negotiations and warned it would pay a price. He later spoke of a “very strong” attack if no agreement is reached.

It is worth remembering that while one possibility is that an Iranian aircraft collided with the helicopter, the circumstances are still under investigation, with no certainty regarding intent behind the event, according to the Iranian version of the incident. That detail matters: Trump treated it as a clear act of war by Tehran, even though the operational reality was somewhat less orderly and definitive than the political declaration suggested.

This is exactly his method: raise his voice, deploy aircraft, and then leave the door open for a deal. He does not appreciate long wars, certainly not with midterm elections approaching. Fuel prices affect every US household, and his campaign promise was to end wars and make deals, not open another Middle Eastern quagmire.

One of the most intriguing details Trump provided this week was not about bombs but about oil tankers. He said the US military had secretly helped move more than 100 million barrels of oil through Hormuz aboard 22 vessels that sailed at night without lights after Iranian radar capabilities had been damaged. Even after stripping away Trump’s usual layer of exaggeration, one central fact remains: nearly every component of the crisis converges around Hormuz, including oil, trade, energy prices, and political pressure on the White House. Therefore, any disruption is felt very quickly in Washington. 

This is also why Americans continue talking with the Iranians even after the strikes. Qatar has once again assumed the role of intermediary, shuttling between negotiating rooms and bombing zones.

Both the US and Iran strike while keeping mediators involved. This has long ceased to be classical diplomacy. It is a negotiation conducted somewhere between a US Central Command statement and a presidential post on social media, between an American refueling aircraft over the Gulf and a phone call in Doha. That is how Trump operates, and by now it seems many have grown accustomed to the style. 

Anyone looking for clean logic in this episode will be disappointed. Trump wants the Iranians to understand that time is running out, but not to the point that talks collapse. The Iranians want to show they are not intimidated, but not to the point that they invite a large-scale attack. The Qataris want to remain indispensable mediators. The Gulf states primarily want tankers to keep sailing. Europe does not want to wake up to oil prices reminiscent of the 1970s. And Israel, as usual, wants the US to finish the job, but the US defines the word ‘finish’ differently.

Iran does not appear ready to surrender. The leadership in Tehran has suffered serious blows, but regimes like this do not always soften under fire. Sometimes they harden. They look for external enemies, close ranks, and raise the price of compromise.

The recent decision by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors demanding that Iran report its enriched uranium stockpile and allow verification adds genuine pressure. The resolution passed by a vote of 21 to three, with 10 abstentions.

According to the IAEA, Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% before the strikes. For Israel, that is the critical test. In Trump's pursuit of a deal and a photo opportunity, it could end up pushed to the sidelines.

Officials in Jerusalem understand this gap very well. Israel wants heavy American pressure on Iran, preferably military pressure. There is no substitute for American aircraft in the Gulf, no substitute for a credible American threat against Iranian facilities, and no substitute for Tehran facing the president of the United States, not just the Israeli Air Force. Yet that same American presence can also create complications for Israel. Trump may use force in order to secure a quick agreement without fully dismantling the Iranian threat.

This is where the real drama in Trump-Netanyahu relations lies. Not in press conferences, videos, or mutual praise designed largely for domestic audiences, but in the conversations where Trump reins Netanyahu in.

Trump reportedly blocked an Israeli strike in Beirut after Iran warned that continued operations in Lebanon would jeopardize contacts with Washington. In one conversation, according to sources familiar with the matter, he called Netanyahu "crazy" and warned that a strike in Beirut would further isolate Israel.

It was the kind of conversation Netanyahu does not enjoy, not because of the sharp tone, but because of the message. This time, Washington was not asking Jerusalem for advice. It was demanding restraint.

Trump is unwilling to let Netanyahu manage his own timetable. The Israeli prime minister sees Iran as the project of his lifetime and one of his last major political assets. Trump sees Iran as a file that must be closed before it consumes his presidency and his midterm elections.

As long as the use of force serves Trump's diplomatic objectives, the differences between him and Netanyahu remain manageable. But once the discussion shifts to how far pressure should go and how long military pressure should continue, the American president reminds Jerusalem who sets the boundaries.

That is why extending calm on the Lebanese front fits neatly into the broader American effort toward Iran. From Washington's perspective, every additional front is noise in the system. If an Israeli strike in Beirut gives Tehran an excuse to walk away from negotiations, the Americans will pressure Jerusalem instead. From Israel's perspective, that is frustrating and at times dangerous. Hezbollah does not disappear simply because Trump wants quiet. But when Washington is trying to negotiate an agreement with Iran, Lebanon becomes a place where Israel is expected to swallow more than it would prefer.

The question is what exactly Trump is trying to achieve. If the goal is a limited agreement, reopening Hormuz, reducing attacks, securing a general Iranian commitment on the nuclear issue, and maintaining oversight, then he has a chance. Iran needs economic oxygen. Gulf states want stability. Trump wants a photo. Preferably one with a grand statement, a broad smile, and as few missiles in the background as possible.

If the goal is a deeper solution addressing the nuclear program, uranium stockpiles, missile capabilities, proxy networks, and Iran's ability to rebuild, the road is much longer. Threatening a radar site or an air defense battery will not be enough. It would require a rigorous verification mechanism, access to facilities, timetables, automatic sanctions snapbacks, and above all, a willingness by the United States to remain focused on Iran even after the cameras are gone.

That is precisely where Israel worries about Trump. He loves the moment of the big announcement. The painstaking work that comes afterward, monitoring mechanisms, timelines, and technical clauses, has never been his strongest suit.

Even the US administration is not completely unified. Some see the strikes as temporary leverage on the road to an agreement. Others argue that any deal would merely allow Iran to recover.

Security officials understand how quickly an incident in Hormuz could escalate into an attack on an American base, a ship, or global energy markets. Republican politicians are already thinking about November and how to sell voters on strength without war, military action without body bags, and fuel prices that do not turn a geopolitical victory into an electoral defeat.

Tehran is making a similar calculation from the opposite direction. Iranian leaders know Trump wants a deal. They know he does not want a prolonged war. They also understand that even without physically closing the strait, merely threatening freedom of navigation is enough to unsettle markets and pressure Washington. Iran does not need to defeat the US Navy. It only needs to prove that efforts to squeeze it will impose costs on everyone.

That reality creates Israel's dilemma. A small agreement may be good for America, good for markets, good for Gulf states, and good for Trump. It may be bad for Israel if it leaves Iran battered but not neutralized, weakened but still possessing uranium that has not been fully accounted for. More cautious, perhaps, but also convinced that the lesson of the war is that it must reach a strategic insurance policy more quickly.

Israel understands that danger well. The threat does not disappear simply because an American president declares that he has solved it.

For Netanyahu, there is little room for maneuver. He can praise Trump, leak reports of close coordination, and argue that American pressure validates the Israeli approach. In reality, he depends on the American president more than he would like to admit. Trump is the one who enables Israel's freedom of action, and he is also the one who can limit it with a single phone call.

There is a certain irony in that. The American president, often considered Netanyahu's closest ally, is also the one most willing to restrain him when White House priorities require it.

The four main possible scenarios ahead are relatively clear.

The first, and most likely, is continued limited strikes alongside intensive negotiations. Another military target, another threat, another Qatari envoy, another defiant Iranian statement designed to preserve national pride.

The second is a deadly incident involving Americans, an attack on a base, a ship, or US personnel, which would require a far broader response.

The third is the collapse of negotiations and a return to open regional war, with Israel directly involved and its civilian population once again paying the price.

The fourth, and from Jerusalem's perspective the most troubling, is success that comes too quickly: an agreement that calms Hormuz, lowers oil prices, delivers Trump a victory, and leaves the nuclear question for another day.

In that scenario, Israel would need to act quietly but firmly. Do not fight publicly with Trump. Not appear to sabotage an American agreement. Not to give Iran an excuse to leave the negotiating table. At the same time, it would need to work through every available channel to ensure that any agreement is more than simply clearing a traffic jam in Hormuz.

The boring details will be the decisive ones: Where is the uranium? Who verifies it? When is it verified? What happens if Iran refuses? Who restores sanctions? What remains of Iran's missile arsenal?

The reality that has emerged is far more complex than the simple headline of "America versus Iran." It is the United States striking Iran in order to bring it back to the negotiating table; an Iran willing to talk but unwilling to appear defeated; an Israel that wants the Americans to go all the way, while discovering that Washington defines the finish line differently; and a Netanyahu trying to ride Trump's momentum only to discover that Trump does not like anyone else holding the reins.

The helicopter near Hormuz was the trigger. The real struggle is over the story told afterward. Trump will want to say it was the moment Iran finally understood. Netanyahu will want to say it was the moment America truly entered the fight. Iran will want to say it was simply another round that it survived.