Seventy-six years ago, the People’s Republic of China launched its first flagship, the Nanchang. This was the ship’s third life. First known as the Uji and then the Changzhi, it had been delivered to the Communists by Nationalist mutineers, and the Nationalists themselves acquired the ship as a prize of war from Japan.
In the 21st century, Beijing does not need hand-me-downs for its military.
Through an impressive and sustained industrial push, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded and modernized, aiming to become a “world class military” by mid-century. Already it boasts the world’s largest navy, expansive cyber capabilities, and a massive array of rockets and missiles.
This expansion is not just significant in absolute terms. It is not possible to think about the PLA’s expansion without considering its peer competitor, the United States. While the U.S. military remains the pre-eminent military force as its power relative to the PLA diminishes, the international landscape changes.
The implications of these changes are of great consequence to Australia.
Any robust conversation about Australian defense policy – how we structure and invest in our own capabilities as well as what partnerships we form – must be informed by all the facts. And a signal fact is that, as Sam Roggeveen and I show in a recent report for the Lowy Institute, the PLA’s military expansion is steadily chipping away at one of Australia’s principal defensive assets: geography.
The PLA’s growing force of long-range bombers and missiles will be able to threaten parts of Northern Australia in the future, eroding the sanctuary provided by geography. In the case of China’s highly sophisticated cyber capability, geography provides no sanctuary at all.
The growth of the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) blue-water fleet – from destroyers to frigates to submarines to aircraft carriers to replenishment ships – demonstrates China’s aspirations for a global navy. Long-range expeditions such as Task Group 107’s circumnavigation of Australia in 2025 will become increasingly common.
Our report does not ascribe any specific intentions from China in relation to Australia. But knowing what capabilities a state has is as important to defense planning as any assessment of their intentions – indeed, capabilities inform intentions.
A better understanding of another state’s capabilities means better planning by Australia. The National Defense Strategy says that the Australian Defense Force (ADF) must deter threats, shape Australia’s environment, and respond to contingencies. The changing military balance in the Indo-Pacific affects the scale of those threats, the nature of that environment, and the substances of those contingencies.
In Chinese planning, a contingency involving forced unification with Taiwan remains a central issue. An attack on Australia, therefore, is not a high or even a medium priority. But to threaten Australian interests, one does not need to strike Australian territory.
The disruption to international trade caused by the U.S. military adventure in Iran has demonstrated in no uncertain terms that Australia is not immune to shocks occurring on the other side of the world. Should Beijing take action to change the status quo regarding Taiwan, it would disrupt some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes – shipping lanes that carry enormous amounts of Australian exports and imports.
Moreover, should such a Taiwan contingency occur, the debate would not be over if Australia should be involved. Australia operates installations key to the U.S. military presence in Asia – like Pine Gap and North West Cape – hosts an important contingent of U.S. Marines in Darwin, and is expanding the RAAF base at Tindal to host U.S. strategic bombers. In the event of a war, these sites would certainly be targets, and would be in range.
With the likelihood that China will project force closer to Australia in the coming decades, we cannot pretend that the country is under an imminent threat. But neither can we pretend we are insulated from threats.
For the scale of the challenges faced, the ADF cannot be seen as an impersonal arm of policy. How it shapes the regional environment, and deters and responds to threats, affects all Australians. Understanding how the region’s military build-up is changing Australia’s circumstances, therefore, is vital. An informed public is more empowered to engage in substantive conversations about defense.
If these are “the most challenging circumstances Australia has faced since the Second World War,” such conversations are not just useful; they are imperative.
