The renewed Lebanon war between Israel and Hezbollah that began on March 2 is now over a month old, with little change in the overall picture or disposition of the main actors. However, Israeli officials have reframed initial publicly stated goals for the conflict away from an imminent disarmament of Hezbollah, signaling a more prolonged approach. Simultaneously, political disagreements over the conflict and Hezbollah’s status have arisen in Lebanon while Hezbollah has escalated its attacks against Israel and rhetoric.
The Israeli military continues to control the tempo of the fighting. Israeli operations against Hezbollah remain more intense and expansive than the September to November 2024 phase of the war, but have noticeably transitioned from an initially ferocious retaliatory campaign to a sustained war of attrition. Israeli war aims remain the same. However, the apparent means of achieving them have crystallized into narrower objectives of establishing a security zone in southern Lebanon and continuing to attack Hezbollah’s assets and personnel, while pressing the Lebanese government to disarm the group.
Lebanon, meanwhile, remains unable to implement any of the decisions it has taken against Hezbollah or its Iranian patron, including a March 2 ban on Hezbollah’s military activities and a directive to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to disarm the group. Hezbollah continues to fight in defiance of Beirut’s orders. Amidst this impasse, the international community, including the United States, has shown little practical interest in ending the conflict in Lebanon.
Israel shifts its immediate war goals but remains committed to Hezbollah’s disarmament
Israel’s overall objective during this phase of the Lebanon war remains achieving Hezbollah’s disarmament. At face value, this appears more expansive than the Israeli goal from October 8, 2023, until the ceasefire that went into effect on November 27, 2024. Then, Israel merely wanted Hezbollah to end its attacks in support of Gaza and withdraw from the Southern Litani Area, which would allow northern Israeli residents to return home without the threat of rocket fire.
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir articulated this goal at the outset of the renewed fighting, saying Israel “would not relent from disarming Hezbollah.” Several senior Israeli officials echoed the sentiment since then. However, Zamir later clarified that he envisioned achieving this aim through a prolonged process. Perhaps reflecting this assessment, on April 3, the IDF reframed its objectives more narrowly, saying militarily disarming Hezbollah was unrealistic because such an endeavor would require occupying all of Lebanon, which surpasses Israel’s means.
Hezbollah’s political and operational nerve center sits in Beirut’s southern suburbs, and it maintains military assets and training sites from the town of Beqaa up to the town of Hermel. The IDF lacks the manpower to invade these strongholds and hold them until Hezbollah is disarmed. The Israeli military’s roughly 635,000 active and reserve personnel include a far smaller combat force.
Israel would have to occupy hostile, unpacified terrain over extended lines while simultaneously pushing north through south Lebanon, up the coast toward Dahiyeh, and along Lebanon’s northeastern border with Syria—all while remaining undermanned and overcommitted across other vital active fronts, and prepared for additional theaters to ignite. Airpower alone cannot disarm Hezbollah. Israel’s sustained aerial campaign over the past 15 months hindered, but didn’t halt, Hezbollah’s comprehensive regeneration.
The IDF is instead planning to soon present the Israeli government with a proposal to establish a “security zone” in south Lebanon about 2–3 kilometers from the Blue Line, Israel’s de facto frontier line with Lebanon. Per the plan, no Israeli outposts will be built in the area. Lebanese civilians would be evacuated from the zone to prevent friction between the locals and IDF troops.
The campaign, however, is expected to persist—even past a ceasefire with Iran—during which the IDF aims to ensure Hezbollah operatives do not return to locales within the security zone. In fact, as far as can be told from open source materials, the IDF has already begun pushing into south Lebanon to establish this zone, in some cases seizing the second line of Lebanese frontier villages approximately 6 kilometers from the border.
A map showing the latest IDF, Hezbollah, LAF, and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) positions in south Lebanon (Google Maps, created/annotated by David Daoud and Ron Kimel):
Israeli officials have repeatedly spoken about establishing such a buffer zone in southern Lebanon. It remains unclear, however, whether the IDF still intends to reach the Litani River along both the southern Lebanese coast and the interior before falling back to this smaller strip of territory.
The political echelon, meanwhile, remains committed to achieving the maximalist goal—but, ultimately, through Lebanese efforts. Politically, Israel still wants a Lebanon where Hezbollah is disarmed or at least is no longer a cross-border threat, and continues to call on Beirut to move toward such an outcome.
Lebanon struggles to assert its sovereignty
Domestic disunity continues to hamper Lebanese efforts to implement the government’s decisions to disarm Hezbollah and other attempts to assert sovereignty. Domestic fractures are, according to a recent Reuters report, nearing breaking points along sectarian and political lines. Displaced Shiites have encountered hostility from other Lebanese, with local authorities vetting the arrivals for links to Hezbollah and the presence of the group’s operatives, for fear they may attract Israeli targeting.
On March 24, Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi declared Iran’s ambassador-designate to Lebanon, Mohammad Reza Shibani, persona non grata and ordered his departure from Lebanon by March 29. The move was symbolic, as the ministry said it would not impact Beirut’s relations with Tehran, and Shibani had yet to formally assume his ambassadorial role. Nevertheless, Iran has refused to comply, with assistance from influential Lebanese actors—namely, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement.
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who is also the leader of Amal, opposed the decision and asked Shibani to remain in Lebanon. The two parties have also created a narrative casting doubt on the legitimacy of the move, characterizing it, despite contrary reports, as a politically motivated personal move by Raggi that was not coordinated with the Lebanese president or Council of Ministers.
Shiite opposition to Raggi’s decision regarding Shibani has also included Minister for Administrative Reform Fadi Makki, an ostensible political independent and an appointee of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Makki, unlike his Amal and Hezbollah counterparts, has continued to attend cabinet sessions, despite Berri’s requests. However, he has nevertheless expressed his opposition to the decision—echoing the Amal/Hezbollah line that it is unnecessarily divisive at a time of existential crisis.
As of April 2, 1,345 Lebanese have been killed and over 4,000 have been injured during the renewed conflict. An estimated 1.2 million have been displaced. Neither the Lebanese Health Ministry nor Hezbollah has provided an official count of the group’s fallen fighters. However, the IDF claimed to have killed 700 Hezbollah operatives so far, while unnamed sources “familiar with Hezbollah’s count” told Reuters the group’s casualties stood at 400.
Hezbollah continues fighting
Hezbollah remains defiant on the battlefield and in the political sphere.
The group continues to launch attacks into Israel that have escalated in volume. By March 31, Reuters reported that Hezbollah had launched 5,000 projectiles at Israel since the conflict restarted—attacks that have also become more deadly. At least eight Israeli soldiers have been killed in the renewed war so far, with five severely injured and three lightly injured on April 3. On March 24, a Hezbollah rocket attack near Mahanaim Junction in northern Israel killed a 27-year-old woman. A March 26 Hezbollah rocket attack on Nahariya in northern Israel killed one man and wounded 14 people.
At least four waves of attacks have been coordinated with attacks by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) against Israel, per IRGC claims. Additionally, on April 3, IDF troops discovered a cache of Hezbollah first-person view (FPV) drones. Hezbollah’s use of these weapons would make its battlefield threat cheaper, more precise, and harder to suppress/intercept than rockets, especially against armor and exposed troop positions. The discovery dovetails with reports that the group’s regeneration efforts during the ceasefire focused on drone procurement and production, precisely because of these factors.
Hezbollah has shown no intention of halting its attacks. In his most recent statements, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem continued to frame the group’s decision to attack Israel as an act of self-defense on behalf of Lebanon. He also insisted that diplomacy has failed, and Israel and the United States pose an existential threat to Lebanon. Qassem argued that, therefore, only resistance—not disarmament or concessions—can protect the country.
Hezbollah also continues to reject the government’s March 2 decision proscribing the group’s military activities. Wafic Safa, Hezbollah’s former liaison official with Lebanese security agencies, and who the latest reports indicate is the assistant chairman of Hezbollah’s Political Council, called the decision a “grave mistake.”
Safa insisted that Hezbollah would never be disarmed, “not during the battle, not before it, not after it,” and said that in the post-war phase, the group would prioritize the government’s reversal of its March 2 decision. “This government will recant,” he said, “just as Fouad Siniora’s government before,” an implicit reference to Hezbollah’s use of force on May 7, 2008, in response to Beirut’s decision to dismantle the group’s telecommunications system. Safa also said that Hezbollah “may have to regain its prestige by force,” suggesting the group could engage in possible coercion against the Lebanese state or its opponents if anti-Hezbollah decisions are not reversed.
Global resignation over the Lebanon conflict
The international community has not offered any new off-ramps from the conflict in recent weeks. The French diplomatic track remains theoretically active, but only passively. Meanwhile, the United States has continued to decline to act as a mediator between Jerusalem and Beirut. Some reports suggested Washington’s new approach may be to bypass the Lebanese entirely, with one report indicating the US had encouraged Syria to consider helping disarm Hezbollah in eastern Lebanon. US Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack later denied this report.
David Daoud is Senior Fellow at at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies where he focuses on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs.
Tags: Hezbollah, Israel, Israel-Hezbollah, LAF, Lebanese government, Lebanon
