China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, passed in March, takes effect this month. It stands alongside the 1984 Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy as a foundational, comprehensive statute on ethnic affairs, placing the task of forging a strong sense of community squarely within the legal framework.
Yet voices abroad have rushed to brand it an act of “transnational repression” and “long-arm jurisdiction”, training their fire on Article 63.
Such claims borrow from the vocabulary of law but cannot survive its scrutiny. Begin with what Article 63 actually says. It provides that organisations and individuals outside China who act to undermine China’s ethnic unity and progress, or create ethnic division, are to be pursued in accordance with the law. The operative verbs – undermine and create – describe conduct that inflicts harm; they do not go so far as to include policing of opinion.
The article creates no new offence and sets no penalty. It is a referral provision, channelling liability back to existing laws, chiefly the criminal code. Its preamble – it’s the first law in over three decades to have one – frames it around unity, shared destiny and national rejuvenation, rather than coercion.
Nor did Article 63 materialise out of nowhere. Rather, it sits within a legal architecture China has been assembling for decades. Article 4 of China’s constitution, which forbids acts that undermine the unity of ethnic groups or instigate division, is the wellspring of Article 63’s authority.
Article 8 of China’s Criminal Law has long applied to foreigners committing offences abroad against the Chinese state or its citizens, provided the offence is punishable by both three years of jail or more and the law of the place it was committed, while Article 103 defines the crimes of secession and incitement to secession and their penalties. The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy protects ethnic minority rights.
