Strife is growing in eastern Chad’s ethnic Zaghawa communities amid allegations of support for Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.
Suspicions of Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s support for the paramilitary RSF can be traced to the beginning of Sudan’s civil war in 2023, and have gained currency with the revelation that Gen. Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo’s cousin, Gen. Bichara Issa Djadalla, is President Déby’s special advisor.
While Chad denies direct involvement in Sudan’s war, analysts say weapons, particularly from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), continue to be trafficked to the RSF through Chad, despite the border of Sudan being closed in February.
Eastern Chad has become a corridor for arms trafficking and the movement of armed groups, angering the Zaghawa, a tribe represented in much of Chad’s military and security elite. Longstanding border tensions exist among Zaghawa and RSF-affiliated militias, and the RSF has committed atrocities against Zaghawa communities in Sudan.
The eastern town of Adré, on the border with Darfur, Sudan, has become a significant node in the network trafficking weaponry to the RSF, and illicit economies in the area have thrived since Sudan’s war began. Writing for World Politics Review, security analyst Cameron Hudson believes the UAE has offered Déby’s regime financial support and political backing in return for using its territory for supplying the RSF. The UAE denies supporting either side of the Sudanese conflict and says it wants to help broker a peace deal.
The UAE’s financial engagement with Chad has expanded since Sudan’s war began. In 2024, Chad secured a $500 million loan from the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development at a 1% interest rate over 18 years, the Africa Center for Security Studies reported. The previous year, the UAE offered Chad a $200 million financing package, including $50 million in grant assistance.
According to reports by The New York Times newspaper and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, the UAE has established an RSF arms pipeline from its own military bases to the Chadian city of Amdjarass, where the weapons are funneled on to RSF-controlled areas in Sudan. Hudson believes these transactions generate revenue for military officers loyal to Déby and may help him gain favor among RSF leaders..
Many Chadians have family ties to Zaghawa communities in Darfur that have been targeted by RSF attacks for years, causing the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Zaghawa into eastern Chad, exacerbating a critical humanitarian crisis and fueling insecurity. As of March 31, more than 918,760 Sudanese refugees fleeing the conflict have relocated to eastern Chad, straining already-limited resources and services.
The eastern Chadian town of Tiné is among the front lines in N’Djamena’s expanding role in Sudan’s war. The RSF was blamed for a mid-March drone strike in Tiné that killed 20 people attending a funeral. Several members of resident Adam Hamid Arim’s family were injured in the attack, after which hundreds of residents took up arms.
Chad responded by deploying forces, weapons and more than 100 military vehicles to the area.
According to Hudson, the RSF and SAF have increasingly operated inside Chad this year, “suggesting a new, no-holds-barred approach to the fighting.” Days after the Tiné attack, an SAF drone strike near the town hit a fuel depot, killing four people and injuring 23. Hudson believes this indicates that the SAF now views RSF positions in Chadian territory as legitimate targets.
“In short, Déby has managed to antagonize both sides in Sudan’s war and alienate the domestic support base he depends on, while gaining little in return other than the promise of new investments from his Emirati backers,” Hudson wrote.
