Recent naval operations in the Gulf have once again highlighted how rapidly the air and missile defence mission is evolving at sea. The release of footage showing Qatar’s Al Fulk landing platform dock and Al Zubarah-class corvettes launching Aster missiles against aerial threats was more than just a striking operational image. It offered a glimpse into the kind of multi-layered, networked naval defence architecture that shipbuilders and navies are now trying to refine for an era shaped by ballistic missiles, drones, cruise missiles, and saturation attacks.
As previously reported by Naval News, the Qatari fleet—largely built by Fincantieri—have taken part in a wider integrated air defence effort, with different ships contributing different elements of the kill chain. That operational context also helps explain the design direction now visible in Italy’s own future surface combatants, particularly the FREMM EVO and the wider family of Fincantieri warships that are increasingly built around common combat system principles.
According to Fincantieri, this evolution should not be understood as limited to a single frigate class. “It is not only related to the FREMM EVO,” the company said, describing a broader approach that now applies to most of its major naval platforms. In effect, the company’s latest thinking is less about one ship and more about a common architecture for modern naval combat: integrated sensors, layered weapons, ballistic missile defence awareness, and an increasingly serious focus on counter-UAS (CUAS) requirements.
FREMM EVO: Technical Baseline of a “Heavy” Multi-Mission Frigate
The FREMM EVO (Evolution) builds upon the proven Bergamini-class while introducing significant upgrades in combat system architecture, sensor integration, and air defence capability. The platform retains a displacement of approximately 6,700 tons, with an overall length of around 144 meters and a beam close to 20 meters. Its CODLAG propulsion system continues to provide a balance between endurance, speed, and low acoustic signature—preserving the strong and still unmatched anti-submarine warfare variant of the class.
Where the evolution becomes most evident is in the combat system and sensor suite. The FREMM EVO is expected to integrate Leonardo’s latest Kronos family AESA radars, the DBR (Dual Band Radar – fixed faces) offering improved tracking performance against both conventional and high-speed ballistic targets. The ship is also equipped with an upgraded combat management system capable of handling new threat profiles and coordinating layered defensive responses including counter-UAS (CUAS) Systems.
Based on the latest requirements and lessons learned in crisis situations such as the Red Sea, the FREMM EVO will be the first Italian Navy platform equipped with the newest generation counter-UAS (CUAS) suite. The new ships will embark a new CUAS active sensor based on a four fixed face AESA radar, whose antennas were identified on the computer images distributed by Orizzonte Sistemi Navali, being located under the Leonardo conformal IFF antenna on the main integrated mast.
The frigate’s armament remains centred on the Aster missile family, launched via the SYLVER vertical launch system, including the Aster 30 Block 1 New Technology capability associated with ballistic missile defence roles. This is complemented by two 76 mm Super Rapid guns with Strales/DART guided ammunition for close-in air defence, small caliber guns (30mm) with effective proximity-fuse projectiles in the CIWS role, as well as torpedoes and embarked aviation assets.
Taken together, these features position the FREMM EVO not simply as an incremental upgrade, but as a significantly more capable “heavy frigate” designed to operate in high-threat environments.
Beyond a Single Frigate
What emerges is that the FREMM EVO should be seen as part of a wider naval combat system evolution. The company argues that experience gathered from existing Italian Navy programs—especially in anti-air warfare and anti-surface warfare—has been transferred into the next generation while retaining established strengths in anti-submarine warfare.
“The experience we had with the combat system on board FREMM and MPCS (Multi Purpose Combat Ship – PPA), especially in anti-air warfare and anti-surface warfare, has been transferred into the new generation,” Fincantieri said. At the same time, the company insists that the anti-submarine warfare characteristics of the class remain a core strength still unmatched on the international scenario, allowing the new ship to preserve the acoustic and mission advantages that gave the original Bergamini-class much of its operational value.
In Fincantieri’s view, the result is a platform that can be described as a “100 percent multi-purpose combat ship,” covering anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare in a single hull. That same logic increasingly applies to the company’s broader product line, particularly the ships formerly grouped under the MPCS-PPA label. Although those vessels differ in some areas—notably sonar performance and mission emphasis—they are converging toward a common combat system philosophy centred on sensor fusion and layered engagement.
This matters because modern naval warfare is no longer organized around rigid, single-mission platform categories. Frigates are now expected to contribute to fleet air defence, support ballistic missile defence architectures, conduct ASW, react to drone attacks, and operate within highly contested electromagnetic environments. Designing ships around shared combat-system logic is therefore not just a question of industrial efficiency; it is becoming an operational necessity.
Ballistic Missile Defence Moves to the Forefront
One of the most revealing parts of Fincantieri’s explanation concerns ballistic missile defence. In recent years, naval air defence discussions in Europe often focused on cruise missiles and aircraft. But the operational picture in the recent war scenarios has pushed ballistic threats further into the foreground.
Fincantieri stressed that conventional air defence logic is not sufficient against ballistic missiles. “The kinematics and the trajectory of the ballistic missile are completely different,” the company said, noting that a system designed to engage sea-skimming threats cannot simply be assumed to handle ballistic targets without major adaptation.
The core issue begins with detection and tracking. A ballistic missile, particularly in some phases of flight, may present itself as only a very small point in a highly cluttered picture. “Normally, the ballistic missile is just a little point inside the noise,” Fincantieri explained. “A normal tracker cuts the noise and cuts also the target.” That challenge drove the development of a dedicated tracking capability able to extract ballistic targets from background clutter instead of discarding them.
According to the company, that effort required more than radar adaptation alone. The command-and-control chain and combat management system also had to evolve so that the ship could interpret this new class of threat correctly and assign the proper response. In other words, ballistic missile defence is not just about fitting a new missile. It requires a different sensing logic, a different command architecture, and a different engagement process.
This is where the Aster 30 Block 1 family becomes particularly relevant. Fincantieri said that the FREMM EVO is being aligned with this capability set. Existing platforms may also be upgraded through changes to trackers, command systems, and missile integration. The broad message is that ballistic missile defence is no longer a niche feature reserved only for top-tier destroyers. It is increasingly becoming a fleet-wide design consideration.
Lessons from the Gulf and the Value of Integration
The Gulf case is important because it illustrates that modern naval air defence is not necessarily about one ship doing everything alone. Rather, it is about creating an integrated architecture where different units/assets contribute different strengths.
Fincantieri described ballistic missile defence as “an integrated approach” in which separate units may operate remotely but remain fully linked through common command-and-control functions. In practice, that means one ship may provide long-range radar coverage while another carries the interceptors. In another case, a larger support vessel with a powerful radar may help cue a lighter combatant for engagement.
This appears particularly relevant to the Qatari Navy’s force structure, where different Fincantieri-built ships bring different sensor and weapons combinations to the fight. In a regional missile defence scenario, what matters first is early warning and threat direction. “The most important thing is to know the direction of the threat,” Fincantieri said. Once the launch geometry and approximate trajectory are understood, a defending force can orient sensors, assign firing solutions, and prepare interceptors much more effectively.
That does not mean the problem is solved. Saturation remains a major concern. Even highly capable systems may be strained if the attacker can launch a sufficiently dense salvo. On that point, Fincantieri’s assessment was notably realistic: some weapons may get through “not because they are not able to contrast, but just because the defence system is saturated.” That is an up-to-date observation, and one increasingly shared across navies observing events in the Red Sea, Gulf, and Black Sea.
Counter-UAS and the Cost-Asymmetry Problem
If ballistic missiles are the strategic high end of the threat spectrum, drones and loitering munitions occupy the opposite end—but they may be just as operationally disruptive. They are cheaper, smaller, often harder to classify quickly, and can be deployed in large numbers.
Fincantieri was blunt on the economics of this fight. Using a very expensive missile against a very cheap drone is simply not sustainable. Instead, the company pointed to layered defensive tools intended to preserve high-end missiles for high-end threats.
Among the key solutions is the 76 mm gun with guided Strales/DART ammunition, which offers a much more economical way to defeat many air targets. Fincantieri said that with such ammunition, two guided rounds can provide a very high probability of kill at a cost drastically below that of a missile engagement. The 30 mm generation of programmable ammunition systems also plays an important role in this close- and medium-range layer, offering another relatively affordable response against asymmetric aerial threats.
The FREMM EVO’s dedicated CUAS enhancements fit directly into this logic. Red Sea lessons have clearly accelerated the need for specialized detection and engagement capabilities against small targets. The addition of a four-face AESA radar for CUAS functions underlines that this is no longer treated as a secondary or optional add-on. It is becoming a central design feature.
Passive Detection and the New Sensor Layer
Fincantieri also placed major emphasis on passive sensing, especially for operations in an emissions-controlled environment. Alongside active radar systems, the company highlighted a new infrared search and track approach designed by Leonardo (DSS IRST – Distributed Static Staring and InfraRed Search and Tracking) to provide wide-area passive surveillance.
According to Fincantieri, the new E/O IRST system includes multiple static and dynamic sensors arranged to provide full coverage around the ship. The company claims that this arrangement allows the combat system not only to determine the direction of a target, but also to estimate its distance—a major improvement over older passive systems that provided bearing only.
“This new system can give you, in passive configuration, direction and distance,” Fincantieri said. That would allow a ship to operate with radars and other emitters silent while still maintaining the ability to detect and react to drones, missiles, and other asymmetric threats. In a naval environment increasingly shaped by electronic surveillance and anti-radiation risks, this kind of passive capability may become just as important as raw radar performance.
A New Way of Thinking About Frigates
Taken together, the FREMM EVO and its associated technologies point to a broader change in how Western navies are thinking about frigates. The ship is still expected to hunt submarines, escort high-value units, and conduct surface warfare. But it must now also operate as part of an integrated missile-defence network, carry layered CUAS tools, and contribute to the management of a dense and highly varied threat picture.
That is why the most important aspect of the FREMM EVO may not be any single radar, missile, or gun. It may instead be the fact that the platform is being designed as part of a larger architecture—one in which active and passive sensors, long-range and short-range effectors, and multiple ship classes are expected to function together.
In that sense, the recent Gulf operations involving Fincantieri-built Qatari ships offer a useful preview of the direction of travel. Naval warfare is becoming more networked, more layered, and more dependent on balancing high-end capabilities with sustainable, lower-cost responses to mass threats.
The FREMM EVO sits squarely in that transition. It is not just an improved frigate. It is a warship designed for a maritime battlespace in which the distinction between air defence, missile defence, drone defence, and electronic warfare is increasingly blurred.
