Ukraine Creates Multiple Risk Points Now for Putin
Tim Ash argues that the war in Ukraine is entering a more confident and strategically advantageous phase for Kyiv, driven by advances in drone warfare, expanding European financing, and Ukraine’s growing ability to scale domestic defense production. He says Ukraine is increasingly taking the fight d
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There appears to be a different mood around Ukraine at present, a sense of confidence that the momentum in the war with Russia is moving in its favor.
Drones, technology, and financing – assured now by Europe – seem to have put Ukraine in the driving seat. Ukraine has the innovation advantage and European money – the €90 billion EU loan agreed in December and another €100 billion in EU pre-accession funds slated for after 2027 - has enabled Ukraine to take its innovation edge and at last get to scale in drone production.
Ukraine appears to have held the line on the front line in Donbas and elsewhere, turning the battlefield into a war of attrition and a drone killing field. But Ukraine’s long-range drone capability, augmented by the move to scale noted above, is now taking the war to Russia. We have seen that over the past few weeks, with high-profile attacks on St Petersburg and Moscow, both appearing as huge embarrassments to President Putin.
It seems that Ukraine is trying to leverage its advantage to impose even higher military, economic, and political costs on Russia. The ultimate aim, I think, is to force Russia to negotiate on a more realistic agenda based on the maximalist demands presented at the Anchorage summit between President Trump and Putin.
A number of key offensive actions by Ukraine should be noted/underlined:
First, Ukraine’s continued deep-strike drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, with strikes across Russia on oil refineries and energy-related infrastructure, plus the military-industrial complex. The aim is to wear down Russia’s war machine just as it appears to be facing capacity constraints – labor shortages. The attacks on refineries aim to create shortages, bring the war home to the Russian population, and limit fuel supplies to the front lines.
Russian light aircraft operators began testing flights on automotive gasoline as aviation fuel grows scarce, with specialists warning the switch risks engine detonation and reduced thrust.
In terms of attacks on the Russian energy infrastructure, Ukraine had previously held back out of respect for the demands of Western allies, nervous about their likely impact on global energy prices and the global economy. Ukraine was also dependent on Western long-range missiles –ATACMS, HIMARS, Storm Shadow/SCALP et al – so they had to respect the views of the suppliers.
But things have changed here because a) Ukraine has developed its own long-range strike capabilities with drones and missiles; b) The US/Israeli war against Iran lifted constraints on Ukraine hitting Russian energy infrastructure, as it could argue if the U.S. was hitting Iran, disrupting global energy markets, in its self-interest, then why not Ukraine on Russia where its national security interests were at stake? The gloves were taken off.
And I guess, with the war in Iran drawing to a close and oil prices on a downward trend again, the pressure on Ukraine not to hit Russian energy assets has eased further.
Second, reiterating the strikes on St Petersburg and Moscow represented a huge PR win for Ukraine, taking the war to the heart of Russia, and underlining the inability of Russian air defenses and Putin to protect the population from attack by Ukraine.
Third, we are seeing a campaign to isolate and strangulate Crimea. Ukrainian drone strikes on supply convoys have rendered the land route to Crimea lethal. Over the weekend, we saw Ukrainian drone strikes against ferries across the
Kerch Strait to Crimea. And we also saw attacks on key air defense systems around the Kerch Bridge. It seems only a matter of time before the bridge is taken out of service, leaving Crimea marooned. Already, its fuel supplies are at critical levels, and tourists are fleeing in their masses – if they can get fuel.
If Putin’s original annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent invasion of Donbas that same year were intended to protect the security of Crimea and the Russian forces stationed there, then that policy has been, quite literally, blown to smithereens. Questions now surely are whether Ukraine will launch an assault to take Crimea back, albeit it still seems unlikely given the huge human death toll that would likely entail.
Fourth, pressure on Belarus is mounting. Zelensky, over the past week, read out an ultimatum to President Lukashenko – stop support for Russia’s war on Ukraine or else. Zelensky specifically mentioned the use of radars in Belarus, helping Russia target sites in Ukraine, and fuel supplies from Belarus to Russia. Zelensky has cautioned that if this continues, Ukraine may resort to military strikes.
Lukashenko, I think, would be loath to get into a shooting war with Ukraine, as a) the Belarus military would likely not last long, likely reluctant to fight for Lukashenko and against Ukraine; b) it could risk a domestic uprising against Lukashenko. That’s probably Zelensky’s favored outcome.
President Putin would face a nightmare if any domestic move against Lukashenko occurred, as he would likely have to decide whether to divert troops from the war in Ukraine to counter a potential regime change scenario in Belarus.
The latter would obviously be another huge blow to the Putin regime and will just underline the strategic disaster that the war has become, as it now risks the loss of an ally in Lukashenko, following Moscow’s loss of leverage in the South Caucasus (Armenia moving out of Russia’s orbit under Pahshinyan), the loss of Assad in Syria, and Maduro in Venezuela.
I wonder if Moscow would have allowed allies such as Assad and Maduro to fall had its resources not been eroded in Ukraine. I don’t think so.
Actually, what might be happening in Belarus is a Ukrainian feint away from Crimea, helping divide and divert Russian military resources. And perhaps also the strikes in St Petersburg, Moscow, and elsewhere deep inside Russia are also forcing Russia to commit key air defense and other resources away from Crimea. All this is leaving Crimea appearing increasingly vulnerable to attack from Ukraine and unsustainable.
Perhaps here the end result from Ukraine is not a full-blown Ukrainian assault on Ukraine but a negotiating tool to get Russia to pull back from its maximalist demand in Donbas.
What does Putin crave more: Donbas or just holding on to Crimea?
Crimea, as the base of the Black Sea Fleet, was supposed to be such a defining military objective that it forced the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and then the push for a land corridor to Crimea with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Crimea now has neither a land nor a sea corridor! Crimea appears increasingly beleaguered.
Reprinted from the author’s @tashecon blog. See the original here.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily of Kyiv Post.
