Iran’s radar-silent missile system just made its foreign debut in Armenia

Around four Majid AD-08 systems were spotted by open-source analysts during parade rehearsals in Yerevan’s Republic Square on May 25, three days before the official Republic Day celebration. The vehicles carrying the systems differed from the standard Iranian configuration: Iran’s own Majid batteries typically use the Aras 2, a domestically produced pickup truck, while the Armenian-delivered systems appear mounted on the Iveco Daily, a commercially available Italian-made light commercial vehicle that offers easier maintenance, spare parts availability, and cross-compatibility with European logistics chains that Armenia has been developing as part of its broader military diversification effort.

The system’s passive architecture is its defining military characteristic. Conventional short-range air defense systems rely on radar both to detect incoming targets and to guide missiles during their flight, which means they radiate electromagnetic energy that opposing electronic warfare systems can detect, locate, and suppress. The Majid uses no radar for target acquisition or guidance, relying entirely on optical and thermal sensors that emit no detectable signal. A passive system of this type is significantly harder to find and target than a radar-based one, and its missiles cannot be defeated by electronic jamming that works against radar-homed interceptors. In environments saturated with electronic warfare, that characteristic carries genuine operational value.

The system’s international profile was elevated by Iranian claims, circulating since the 2026 conflict, that Majid batteries participated in damaging an American F-35 fighter during operations over Iran, with Iranian-aligned narratives asserting the missile exploited infrared emissions from the aircraft’s propulsion system rather than attempting radar acquisition against its low-observable airframe. Western reporting acknowledged that an F-35 sustained damage from hostile ground fire during the conflict, but attribution to the Majid specifically has not been independently confirmed, and the claim remains unresolved.

Armenia’s acquisition of the Majid fits into a foreign policy trajectory that has accelerated since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, in which Azerbaijani forces, equipped heavily with Israeli-made Harop loitering munitions and Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, defeated Armenian positions in 44 days. That conflict exposed the catastrophic vulnerability of Armenian ground forces to drone and precision strike combinations, and the country has since been on a determined effort to acquire credible air defense and counter-drone capabilities from any supplier willing to sell them. Armenia has purchased French Caesar howitzers, Indian Pinaka rocket artillery systems, Greek Aster 30 missiles through a NATO framework, and now Iranian Majid batteries, a procurement portfolio that spans Western Europe, South Asia, and Iran simultaneously and reflects Yerevan’s calculation that no single patron can meet all its security requirements.

Armenia also confirmed during the May 28 parade that it has acquired Chinese-made CH-4 Rainbow reconnaissance and strike drones, the unmanned aircraft that is functionally comparable to the American MQ-9 Reaper. That acquisition addresses the offensive drone gap that the 2020 war exposed, and taken together with the Majid procurement, it gives Armenia both a counter-drone system and a drone strike capability that it lacked when Azerbaijan’s drone formations swept through Armenian positions in Karabakh.